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ABSTRACT 
Electronic Product Code Discovery Service (EPCDS) is an important concept in supply chain processes and in Internet 
of Things (IOT). It allows supply chain participants to search for their partners, communicate with them and share 
product information using standardized interfaces securely. Many researchers have been proposing different EPCDS 
models, considering different requirements. In this paper, we describe existing architecture designs of EPCDS systems, 
namely Directory Service Model, Query Relay Model and Aggregating Discovery Service Model (ADS). We also 
briefly mention Secure Discovery Service (SecDS) Model, which is an improved version of Directory Service Model 
with a secure attribute-based access control mechanism. Then, we analyze the strengths and limitations of these models, 
by comparing based on non-functional features such as data ownership, confidentiality, business relationship independ- 
ence, availability, reliability, implementation complexity, visibility, and scalability. From the analysis results, we have a 
better understanding of which model is more suitable in what kinds of situations or scenarios. Moreover, we suggest 
possible improvements and identify possible future add-on applications to SecDS model in the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Supply chain is a process of transforming natural re- 
sources or raw materials into finished goods, by passing 
through suppliers, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, 
customers and other supply chain partners [1]. When 
various supply chain partners work together to deliver 
the right amount of goods to the right customers at right 
time and right place, good coordination and information 
sharing are critical.  
Lack of information sharing among supply chain part- 
ners can lead to a lot of negative consequences. For in- 
stance, when downstream retailers are not willing to 
share their end customer information (e.g. for security 
and privacy reasons), upstream suppliers and manufac- 
turers have no idea about the customers. The manufac- 
turers predict the customer demand from wholesalers’ 
orders, while wholesalers predict the customer demand 
from the retailers’ orders. This lack of information trans- 
parency can lead to “bullwhip effect” where each up- 
stream supply chain participant observes greater demand 
variation and greater need for safety stocks, consequently 
bearing greater costs [2]. The whole supply chain can 
suffer as it becomes less responsive to demand fluctua- 
tions.  
Therefore, in today’s market where competition is 
very intense, it becomes increasingly important to have a 
structured way of fast and secure information sharing 
among supply chain partners. Standardized systems and 
communication methods, which can be used uniformly 
across different organizations around the globe, are re- 
quired to be developed. 
As such, EPCglobal organization [3], which is respon- 
sible for standardization of Electronic Product Code 
(EPC) technology [4], created EPCglobal Network [5] 
for sharing RFID information. EPCglobal Network is 
implemented, using standards from EPCglobal Architec- 
ture Framework [6]. It has four components, namely Ob- 
ject Naming Service (ONS), EPC Discovery Services 
(EPCDS), EPC Information Services (EPCIS) and EPC 
Security Services [5]. In this paper, we focus mainly on 
EPCDS models, since standardization of EPCDS design 
is still an open research question [6].  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
background information on EPCDS and EPCIS. Section 
3 briefly describes existing EPCDS models which include 
Directory Service Model, Query Relay model and Aggre- 
gating Discover Service model. In Section 4, we describe 
SecDS model which is an extension of Directory Service 
Model. Section 5 gives comparison of the different 
models and Section 6 summarizes the analysis. Then, we 
identify possible improvements for SecDS model in 
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Section 6 and finally we conclude the paper in Section 7 
with the role of EPCDS in future Internet of Things (IOT) 
[7]. 
2. Background 
2.1. EPCDS 
Electronic Product Code Discovery Service (EPCDS) is a 
service that allows users to find supply chain partners 
who possess a given product. A user just need to key in a 
particular EPC number, such as RFID number of the 
product, to search for EPC Information Services (EPCIS) 
provided by the related supply chain partners within the 
network.  
EPCDS can be compared to telephone directory or 
search engines of the internet. To request information 
about a particular EPC, a supply chain participant needs 
to have knowledge of who are its supply chain partners 
and their network addresses or URLs that should be que- 
ried. This is like the need to know the phone numbers 
before contacting each other. Then, EPCDS acts like a 
telephone directory or yellow page where the contacts or 
addresses of EPC information providers or repositories 
are aggregately stored and returned to the appropriate 
queries accordingly, as shown in Figure 1 [8].  
Basically, EPCDS supports two operations, publishing 
operation and querying operation. Publishing operation is 
for EPCIS to publish their information on EPCIS whereas 
querying operation is for supply chain users, who want to 
find published EPCIS addresses. 
2.2. EPCIS 
In this context, EPC Information Service (EPCIS) can 
simply be viewed as a database or repository owned by a 
supply chain participant. It stores event information of 
supply chain products, where each product is uniquely 
identified by an EPC number. EPC event information 
includes product information, product location, date and 
time of product arrival and departure, involved business 
processes, and other important business information [6]. 
To share its critical business information with its 
trusted supply chain partners, EPCIS provides a querying  
 
Figure 1. EPCDS as a directory of EPCIS. 
interface for its repository. However, EPCIS may main- 
tain access control mechanisms to ensure that only au- 
thorized users can access its sensitive information. With 
EPCIS querying service, any authorized users, who know 
the address of EPCIS service, can get access to its EPC 
repositories or databases easily.  
2.3. Definition of Terms 
In our paper, the terms “users” or “clients” is used for 
supply chain participants who want to get EPC event 
information from EPCIS. EPCIS company (owner), da- 
tabase and its services are collectively mentioned as 
“EPCIS”, “resource”, “EPCIS resource” “EPCIS reposi- 
tory” or “EPCIS company”. 
3. Existing Discovery Service Models 
BRIDGE (Building Radio frequency identification for 
the Global Environment) project has modeled and ana- 
lyzed eight possible high level designs of EPCDS in 
2007. After considering each model’s feasibility, BRIDGE 
selected the two models of EPCDS, called Directory 
Service Model and Query Relay Model [8]. Although 
there are a lot of variations of these two models, our pa- 
per only use basic models suggested in BRIDGE docu- 
ment for simplicity purpose. The third EPCDS design is 
Aggregating Discovery Service (ADS) Model, proposed 
by Hasso Plattner Institute for IT Systems Engineering in 
2010 [9]. 
3.1. Directory Service Model 
In Directory Service Model, EPCDS stores a directory of 
EPC numbers and corresponding EPCIS addresses. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the steps of this Directory Service Model. 
Step 1: An owner of an EPCIS first registers at EPCDS 
with the details on which EPC numbers they are handling, 
together with its service address or URL. EPCDS stores 
the pairs of EPC numbers and EPCIS addresses in its 
lookup table. 
Step 2: User sends query to EPCDS with a specific 
EPC number or a range of EPC numbers as parameters. 
Step 3: EPCDS uses lookup table to look up queried 
EPC numbers, finds corresponding EPCIS addresses and 
returns them to the user. 
 
Figure 2. Steps in Directory Service Model. 
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Step 4: With the returned addresses, the user queries 
directly to EPCIS repositories to get the desired required 
EPC event information. 
Step 5: EPCIS repositories return the required EPC 
event information to the user. 
One of the main problems of Directory Service Model 
is that EPCDS returns all the related EPCIS addresses to 
every user who queries. Access control mechanisms are 
not specified in detail. 
Based on the query result, every user knows exactly 
which EPCIS repositories are handling which EPC num- 
bers. Availability of EPCIS addresses indicates owner- 
ship of product information in that EPCIS companies. 
Therefore, many companies, who consider their posses- 
sion of items as confidential or sensitive information, do 
not want to expose their EPCIS addresses and are reluc- 
tant to publish them on EPCDS.  
3.2. Query Relay Model 
In the query relay model, EPCDS does not return the 
service addresses of EPCIS repositories immediately 
upon request. Instead, it redirects the query to corre- 
sponding EPCIS repositories which have their own ac- 
cess control mechanisms. As shown in Figure 3, query 
relay model has the following steps. 
Step 1: An owner of an EPCIS first registers at EPCDS 
with the details on which EPC numbers they are handling, 
together with its service address or URL. Then, EPCDS 
stores the pairs of EPC numbers and EPCIS addresses in 
the lookup table.  
Step 2: User sends query to EPCDS with a specific 
EPC number or a range of EPC numbers as well as user’s 
credentials as parameters. 
Step 3: EPCDS uses lookup table to look up queried 
EPC numbers, finds corresponding EPCIS addresses and 
relays user’s query and credentials to those EPCIS re- 
sources. 
Step 4: Each EPCIS resource checks user’s credentials 
against its own access control database and returns the 
query result to the authenticated user directly. 
Actually, in query relay model, user query can be of 
two types. The first one is a full query, directly request- 
ing EPCIS to return the full EPC event information. The 
second query type is a resource query, where EPCIS re- 
turns only the service address that user should query to  
 
Figure 3. Steps in query relay model. 
get required EPC event information. 
3.3. Aggregating Discovery Service (ADS) 
Aggregating Discovery Service (ADS) model is based on 
the query relay model. In this model, instead of returning 
EPC event information directly to user, each EPCIS re- 
turns the result back to EPCDS. Only after getting replies 
from different EPCIS repositories, EPCDS aggregates 
their information and sends them back to the user. Fig- 
ure 4 shows the steps of aggregating discovery service 
model. 
Step 1: An owner of an EPCIS first registers at EPCDS 
with the details on which EPC numbers they are handling, 
together with its service address or URL. Then, EPCDS 
stores the pairs of EPC numbers and EPCIS addresses in 
the lookup table. 
Step 2: User sends query to EPCDS with a specific 
EPC number or a range of EPC numbers as well as user’s 
credentials as parameters. 
Step 3: EPCDS uses lookup table to look up queried 
EPC numbers, finds corresponding EPCIS addresses and 
relays user’s query and credentials to those EPCIS re- 
sources. 
Step 4: Each EPCIS resource checks user’s credentials 
against its own access control database and returns the 
query result to EPCDS. 
Step 5: EPCDS aggregates the results and relays them 
back to the user. 
4. Secure Discovery Service Model 
Secure Discovery Service model (SecDS) is based on 
Directory Service Model.  
As described in Section 3.1, Directory Service Model 
has a critical problem due to the lack of access control 
system in EPCDS. Sensitive business information may 
be leaked, since EPCDS returns related EPCIS addresses 
to every user query.  
In SecDS model, the basic Directory Service Model is 
improved by implementing a secure access control me- 
chanism inside EPCDS. Access control mechanism in 
EPCDS makes sure that it does not release EPCIS ad- 
dresses to any unauthorized users. Confidentiality of im- 
portant EPC information is preserved.  
As shown in Figure 5, steps in SecDS model are the 
same as steps in Directory Service Model, except that in  
 
Figure 4. Steps in aggregating discovery service model. 
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step 1, access control policies are sent together with EPC 
numbers and EPCIS address from EPCIS. In addition to 
lookup table of EPCIS addresses, EPCDS maintain a 
database on access control policies in SecDS model. 
Moreover, EPCDS provides interfaces for adding, de- 
leting and modifying access control policies. EPCIS 
owners can use these interfaces to synchronize access 
control polices between EPCDS and EPCIS.  
4.1. Architecture of SecDS Model 
Figure 6 describes the overview EPCDS architecture of 
SecDS model with attribute-based access control system 
[10]. 
4.1.1. Data Storage 
Data storage component contains event information re- 
lated to EPC numbers. The attributes of the table are EPC 
number, EPCIS address, Published Date and Time, as 
well as other Publisher information. These attributes can 
be used to define access control polices in EPCDS. 
4.1.2. Policy Storage 
Policy storage component contains two types of access 
control policies for EPCDS. One is for publishing and 
another is for querying. 
Policies for publishing determine who can publish ac- 
cess control policies in EPCDS and are managed by se- 
curity administrators of EPCDS. On the other hand, poli- 
cies for querying are defined by security administrators  
 
Figure 5. Steps in secure discovery service model. 
 
Figure 6. Architecture of EPCDS in SecDS model. 
of each EPCIS and are used to control who is able to 
query its EPC event information. Complexity of SecDS 
model lies in managing policies for querying because 
attribute-based access control is needed for querying us- 
ers. The policies for publishing are simple Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC). 
4.1.3. Policy Management 
Policy management component provides an interface for 
EPCIS owner to publish, update or delete their policies on 
EPCDS. It performs syntax analysis, semantic analysis and 
policy transformation before saving the policies in policy 
storage database. 
Syntax and semantic analysis checks the syntax and 
semantic of submitted policies while policy transforma- 
tion transforms attribute-based access control policies 
into fine-grained access control policies. The purpose of 
transformation is to improve the efficiency of querying. 
However, the trade-off is the increased complexity of 
maintaining the policies. 
4.1.4. Policy Services 
Policy service component supports query modification 
component. Whenever there is a query, policy service 
component searches for related fine-grained access con- 
trol predicates, combines them into one access control 
policy and returns it to query modification component. 
4.1.5. Query Modification 
Query modification component changes normal queries 
into modified queries that comply with the access control 
policies. 
4.1.6. Result Aggregation 
Result aggregation component returns the aggregated 
EPCIS addresses to the user. With the returned EPCIS 
addresses, user can then query to EPCIS companies di- 
rectly to get EPC information. User may also store the 
EPCIS addresses and in the future, query to EPCIS re- 
positories without the need to interact with EPCDS again.  
4.2. Attribute-Based Access Control of SecDS 
Model 
The main contribution of SecDS model lies in its secure 
attribute-based access control system, where each EPCIS 
owner can set his own access control policies based on 
certain attributes. Attribute-based access control (ABAC) 
is chosen, despite its complexity, because it is more 
flexible than other access control systems and fulfills the 
business needs and requirements of supply chain infor- 
mation sharing. 
For instance, an EPCIS owner can define that certain 
EPC numbers are accessible, depending on the role at- 
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tribute of the users (e.g. a manufacturer, wholesaler or 
retailer) and/or the time attribute of EPC events (e.g. af- 
ter 5/11/2011). Generally, there are three types of attrib- 
utes with which an EPCIS can define access control poli- 
cies. 
Subject Attribute: Subject attributes are properties 
related to user companies such as Company ID, Com- 
pany Name, Company Role, Company Location (Coun- 
try, City, etc). 
Object Attribute: Object attributes are properties of 
EPC events such as EPC Number, Time, and Business 
Process. 
Visibility Attribute: Three types of visibility attrib- 
utes can be used, namely whole-stream, up-stream and 
down-stream attribute. 
In whole-stream policy, information related to an EPC 
number can be accessed by users of any companies who 
also publish event information about the same EPC num- 
ber. Intuitively, it means that companies which handle 
the same product along the whole supply chain are al- 
lowed to access information about that product. 
In up-stream policy, the information related to an EPC 
number can be accessed by users of any companies who 
handle the same EPC number before the publishing EP- 
CIS does. For example, in a supply chain of supplier, 
manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler and retailer, the 
distributor’s EPC information can be accessed by the 
supplier and the manufacturer of the same product. 
In down-stream policy, the information related to an 
EPC number can be accessed by users of any companies 
who handle the same EPC number after the publishing 
EPCIS does. In the above supply chain, the distributor’s 
information can be accessed by the wholesaler and the 
retailer of the same product. 
These attribute-based access control policies are main- 
tained in EPCIS companies and synchronized with EPCDS 
all the time. 
5. Comparison of Different EPCDS Models 
There have been research papers on the comparisons of 
different EPCDS models using different requirements. In 
[11], basic requirements for EPCDS design are identified 
to compare Directory Service Model and Query Relay 
model. The requirement features include data ownership, 
security (confidentiality, reliability and availability), busi- 
ness relationship independent design, organic growth, 
scalability and quality of service. 
[9] uses the same requirements from [11] but they 
suggested Aggregating Discovery Service model and 
included it in the comparison. [12] compares scalability 
of Direcotry Service model and Query Relay model us- 
ing supply chain simulation. [13] provides a consolidated 
comparison of Discovery Service architecture designs of 
EPCglobal [6], BRIDGE project [8], Afilias [14], ID@URI 
naming system [15] and Distributed Hash Table DHT- 
based Discovery Service [16], based on the requirements 
from the ISO/IEC 9126 [17] standard, BRIDGE project 
[8] as well as [11].  
Our paper reuses the basic requirements described in 
[11] and adds in more features to evaluate Query Relay 
model, Aggregating Discovery Service model and SecDS 
model. Since SecDS model is an improvement of Direc- 
tory Service model, we do not include the latter in our 
comparison. 
The requirements are rated as “high”, “medium” or 
“low”, indicating that the model highly fulfills, moder- 
ately fulfills or almost does not fulfill the requirements.  
5.1. Data Ownership 
Data ownership is defined as the right to determine data 
usage privileges to other companies and as the ability to 
track the actual usage. EPCIS companies should have 
complete control over its data such as EPCIS address, 
EPC event information, business data as well as the set- 
tings of access control rights.  
In [10], it is assumed that data ownership is lost once 
EPCIS delegates access controls to EPCDS. However, in 
our analysis, we assume that EPCDS is trusted and al- 
ways acts in the way that it is supposed to. It does not 
expose the EPCIS addresses, returned results or pub- 
lished policies to any unauthorized persons.  
5.1.1. Right to Determine Data Usage Privileges 
Query Relay Model: This requirement is highly ful- 
filled since EPCIS manages its own access control poli- 
cies and has local control over its EPC event information. 
It can also determine who can access to its EPCIS ad- 
dress. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: Like query 
relay model, this requirement is also fulfilled in ADS 
model because EPCIS manages its own access control 
policies and possesses the ability to determine who has 
access to its EPC event information.  
Secure Discovery Service Model: In SecDS model, 
EPCIS needs to publish some of its data attributes on 
EPCDS to support attribute-based access control policies. 
However, EPCIS can set the access control polices in 
EPCDS for their data. This requirement is fulfilled, as- 
suming that access control policies in EPCDS works 
perfectly and that EPCDS is completely secured and 
trusted, in a sense that no unauthorized persons has ac- 
cess to the EPC event information.  
5.1.2. Ability to Track Data Usage 
Query Relay Model: This requirement is completely 
fulfilled as EPCDS can track who queries its service ad- 
Copyright © 2012 SciRes.                                                                                  AIT 
S. M. KYWE  ET  AL. 42 
dress and data. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: This require- 
ment is completely fulfilled since every query is handled 
by EPCDS in ADS model. 
Secure Discovery Service Model: This requirement is 
only partially fulfilled in SecDS model. The reason is 
that EPCIS can track who is querying what EPC event 
information but EPCIS does not know who is given its 
EPCIS address until the user issues a query to the re- 
source. 
Although EPCIS has published policies on who can 
access its EPCIS address, this only ensures the confiden- 
tiality of EPCIS address. It does not support any tracta- 
bility of who is given EPCIS address. 
5.2. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is defined as preventing information from 
unauthorized access. In the following analysis, we as- 
sume that communication channel is secure and no ad- 
versary can eavesdrop or perform traffic analysis on the 
network channels. The only potential adversaries are 
users or EPCIS resources. 
5.2.1. Client Confidentiality 
Client confidentiality refers to unrevealing of any user 
query to irrelevant resources. Client confidentiality is 
important because user query reflects the strategic inten- 
tions or aims of the user. Client’s query for EPC event 
information should be treated as sensitive information. 
Query Relay Model: In query relay model, EPCSD 
relays client queries directly to EPCIS resources. The 
user does not have a chance to check the EPCIS ad- 
dresses. Therefore, the user’ interested EPC numbers as 
well as query details may be released to unrelated EPCIS 
resources. Client confidentiality is low in this model. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: Like query 
relay model, EPCDS relays user query directly to the 
registered EPCIS resources. Therefore, client confidenti- 
ality is also low in ADS model.  
Secure Discovery Service Model: In SecDS model, 
the user can get the EPCIS addresses first and check if 
the addresses are in user’s blacklist which contains ad- 
dresses of competitors and dubious resources. Only if 
they are not in the blacklist, user can direct its queries to 
them. Client confidentiality of SecDS model can be rated 
as medium as there are still chances that client queries 
are leaked to irrelevant resources which are not in the 
blacklist. 
5.2.2. Resource Confidentiality 
Resource confidentiality refers to unrevealing of EPC 
event information and EPCIS addresses to unauthorized 
users. Resource confidentiality is assured in all three 
models since they all do not release EPCIS address and 
EPC event data to unauthorized users. 
5.3. Availability and Reliability 
Availability is defined as a system’s immediate readiness 
for usage whereas reliability refers to continuity of ser- 
vice over a prolonged period of time. 
Query Relay Model: When resources query is used in 
query relay model, EPCIS address is returned to the user. 
Whenever user needs to query EPCIS, user can just reuse 
the address from cache. User does not need any help 
from EPCDS to get the desired result. So, even when 
EPCDS is down, user’s request can be fulfilled by EPCIS. 
Therefore, availability and reliability is high in query 
relay model. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: In this model, 
EPCDS is a single point of failure. Once EPCDS is un- 
available, users have no way of communication with EP- 
CIS resources as users do not have any information about 
EPCIS addresses. So, we can conclude that availability 
and reliability of this model is lower than that of query 
relay model and SecDS model.  
Secure Discovery Service Model: Since SecDS model 
returns EPCIS addresses to user, like query relay model, 
the same argument from query relay model goes for high 
availability and reliability in SecDS model. 
5.4. Complexity 
Complexity refers to difficulty of implementing and main- 
taining a system. It indicates time and effort that should 
be put in to use the services provided by the system.  
5.4.1. Client Complexity 
Client complexity is the implementation effort that client 
needs to put in to be able to get the required EPC event 
information. 
Query Relay Model: Normally, firewall matches the 
returning addresses with outbound addresses. However, 
in query relay model, request is sent to EPCDS while a 
number of EPCIS replies to the user. So, client needs a 
proxy which allows incoming traffic from unknown ad- 
dresses. Client also needs to inspect the response by 
checking the session identifier. 
Moreover, since client has no information on the num- 
ber of relevant EPCIS resources, it does not know how 
many responses will be. Therefore, client query needs to 
maintain an open connection state and waits for a certain 
period of time before time out. This asynchronous con- 
nection makes client complexity high in query relay 
model. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: In ADS model, 
client complexity is low since EPCDS returns the aggre- 
gated EPC event information directly.  
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Secure Discovery Service Model: In SecDS model, 
complexity is medium as EPCDS only provides services 
to find the EPCIS addresses. Client itself needs to im- 
plement a system to query to EPCIS resources and ag- 
gregate the results to get the required information. 
5.4.2. EPCDS Complexity 
EPCDS complexity refers to the development and main- 
tenance effort of EPCDS.  
Query Relay Model: Implementation in EPCDS is 
less complex in query relay model. This is because 
EPCDS only needs to maintain a lookup table and relay 
any query accordingly. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: Complexity 
level of EPCDS in ADS model is high. It needs to main- 
tain a number of connections or states of queries while 
connecting to a number of EPCIS. Furthermore, EPCDS 
needs to aggregate the results before sending back to the 
user. The cost for query processing and maintaining a 
number of connections is high. 
Secure Discovery Service Model: In SecDS model, 
complexity of maintaining fine-grained access control 
policy is very high. With every update, delete or publish 
activity, a lot of processing is needed to transform from 
attribute-based access control to fine-grained access con- 
trol. 
5.4.3. Resource Complexity 
Resource complexity is the effort that EPCIS resource 
needs to maintain. 
Query Relay Model: EPCIS resource only needs to 
maintain its own access control policies and returns EPC 
event information to authorized users. Therefore, resource 
complexity is medium in query relay model. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: It is the same 
as query relay model. 
Secure Discovery Service Model: Resource complex- 
ity is relatively high, compared to query relay model and 
ADS model. The reason is that in addition to maintaining 
its own access control database, each EPCIS resources 
needs to make sure that its access control policies are du- 
plicated at the EPCDS level. Whenever there are changes 
in business relationship, access control polices need to be 
updated and synchronized in EPCDS. 
5.5. Scalability 
Scalability refers to the ability to handle large amount of 
user queries and data. EPCDS should be able to support 
increasing network traffic in terms of both user volume 
and data volume. The scalability of EPCDS is highly 
correlated with the complexity of managing EPCDS. 
Query Relay Model: Scalability is not much of an is- 
sue in query relay model. Data volume and query proc- 
essing can increase gradually with the increased number 
of users. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: Scalability is 
one of the main problems of ADS model. As the number 
of user queries increases, EPCDS needs to handle a lot 
more increased connections to EPCIS resources and 
processing of the results. 
Secure Discovery Service Model: Scalability is also 
an issue in SecDS model. With the increased EPCIS re- 
sources registering at EPCDS, a lot more fine-grained 
access control policies need to be stored. These policies 
should be retrieved and processed for each query. More- 
over, as the queries need to be modified according to the 
access control policies, processing load will increase 
significantly with increased number of queries. 
5.6. Independence of Business Relationship 
In supply chain where business relationships and part- 
nerships are unstable, it is important to have EPCDS 
mechanisms which are independent of those business 
relationships. 
Query Relay Model: In query relay model, EPCDS is 
independent on the business relationships of supply chain 
participants. Change in business relationships affects only 
the local access control policies of EPCIS resources. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: The same ar- 
gument goes for ADS model. 
Secure Discovery Service Model: SecDS model is 
dependent on business relationships. Every time there is 
a change in partnerships, access control policies in EPCDS 
should also be updated immediately. 
5.7. Quality of Service 
Quality of service can be measured as the completeness 
and correctness of the result returned to the user. 
Query Relay Model: In query relay model, EPCDS 
does not give user any information about the total num- 
ber of EPCIS resources that is relevant to the user query. 
Consequently, if an EPCIS does not reply due to error or 
unavailable service for a short period, user may just as- 
sume that that EPCIS does not exist. Therefore, com- 
pleteness of query result is not assured in this model. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: In ADS model, 
EPCDS replies the aggregated query result to the user, 
including the EPCIS resources which are relevant to user 
query but cannot return information to the query due to 
error or unavailable service. Even though user cannot get 
the complete result this time, user can still query again 
later to get complete information. 
Secure Discovery Service Model: Like ADS model, 
SecDS model also supports completeness and correctness 
of the query result. Since EPCDS in SecDS model re- 
turns all the relevant EPCIS addresses, user know exactly 
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which EPCIS does not response and query again later. 
5.8. Visibility 
Visibility refers to the amount of observation and as- 
sessment that an EPCDS can make on the performance of 
the overall system. It is important for EPCDS to make 
sure registered EPCIS resources are really fulfilling user’s 
information need. High visibility on the whole system 
can leads to improved service fulfillment as well as qual-
ity assurance. 
Query Relay Model: The visibility of EPCDS is low 
in query relay model because EPCDS just relays the 
query to EPCIS and EPCIS itself replies the results to the 
user directly. EPCDS has no clue on whether an EPCIS 
address is still working and replying to user queries or 
whether the service is really fulfilled. 
Aggregating Discovery Service Model: In ADS model, 
EPCDS has high visibility as EPCDS is responsible for 
aggregating query results for the users. EPCDS can even 
track the up and down times of EPCIS resources as well 
as their performance and efficiency in replying user que- 
ries. 
Secure Discovery Service Model: Like query relay 
model, SecDS model also returns the EPCIS addresses 
only. SecDS model does not know whether an EPCIS 
address is still valid and working. EPCDS cannot track if 
the users actually get the information that is needed. 
Therefore, the visibility is low in SecDS model. 
6. Discussion 
Table 1 below provides a summarized comparison be- 
tween query relay model, aggregating discovery service 
(ADS) model and SecDS model. 
Query relay model performs well in all areas, except 
its high client complexity, low client confidentiality, low 
EPCDS visibility and low quality of service. This model 
is generally good for both EPCDS and EPCIS companies 
because it provides less implementation complexity and 
high scalability for EPCDS as well as great data owner- 
ship and confidentiality for EPCIS. The only potential 
problem is that EPCDS may not be able to track its ser- 
vice fulfillment. Nonetheless, the user may be reluctant 
to use the service of this model since it requires user’s 
complex system implementation but does not guarantee 
user’s confidentiality and completeness of query result. 
On contrary to query relay model, Aggregating Dis- 
covery Service (ADS) model has high quality service for 
user and high visibility for EPCDS. It also provides high 
data ownership and confidentiality of EPCIS companies. 
Nevertheless, client confidentiality is not assured and 
EPCDS is a single-point-of-failure in this model. EPCDS 
also needs to bear high maintenance cost and scalability 
is an issue for EPCDS. 
SecDS model is generally good in terms of data own-
ership and confidentiality for all EPCIS companies and 
users. Like query relay model, it provides reliable service 
with good quality and high visibility. However, it has 
high complex implementation for users, EPCIS as well as 
EPCDS. As a result, scalability is a big issue in SecDS 
model. 
7. Possible Future Improvements to SecDS 
Model 
7.1. Policy Synchronization 
In SecDS model, access control policies should be du- 
plicated and synchronized perfectly between EPCIS and 
EPCDS. 
However, in the current implementation, only the pol-  
Table 1. Summary of requirement analysis. 
Assessed Features Query Relay Model ADS Model SecDS Model 
Data Ownership: Right to Determine Data Usage Privileges High High High 
Data Ownership: Ability to Track the Usage High High Medium 
Client Confidentiality Low Low Medium 
Resource Confidentiality High High High 
Availability and Reliability High Low High 
Client Complexity* High Low Medium 
EPCDS Complexity* Low High High 
Resource Complexity* Medium Medium High 
Scalability High Low Low 
Independent of Business Relationship High High Low 
Quality of Service Low High High 
Visibility Low High High 
*Although “High” indicates positive assessment in features like data ownership and confidentiality, “High” level of implementation complexity stands for nega-
ve evaluation of the feature. ti   
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icy administrator in EPCIS can publish policies to EPCDS 
while normal publisher cannot. This indicates that there 
may be some delay in publishing EPC event data and 
policies. In this delayed time window, any users can 
query the EPC event information. The formal implemen- 
tation of SecDS model will enable that every normal 
publisher of EPC information can also publish related 
policies immediately.  
Moreover, as policy publishing and data publishing are 
two separate operations in SecDS model, there is still a 
risk of resource forgetting to publish access control poli- 
cies after publishing data. This can also lead to exposing 
sensitive information to random users. SecDS model 
should make it mandatory for every user who publishes 
event data to simultaneously publish related access con- 
trol policies. 
7.2. Improved Tractability and Data Ownership 
As mentioned in Section 5.1.2. , the current implementa- 
tion of SecDS model does not provide any traceability 
functions for EPCIS resources to track who has queried 
its EPCIS address. It would be nice to have such feature, 
where EPCDS informs resources, every time EPCIS ad-
dress is given to any authorized user. 
7.3. Client Application 
Current functions in EPCDS of SecDS model are mainly 
implemented as services. As a result, users need to im- 
plement their own systems to query EPCIS resources and 
aggregate the results. In order to reduce complexity for 
users, it would be good to develop a sample secure client 
application which stores EPCIS addresses, queries to 
EPCIS resources and aggregate the results efficiently. As 
such, those users, who do not implement their own sys- 
tem, can use this application to get the required EPC 
event information. 
7.4. Load Balancing and Clustering 
As mentioned in Section 5.5., SecDS model might have 
problem of supporting increased number of user queries 
and EPCIS resources. To solve this problem of scalabil- 
ity, load balancing and clustering techniques can be con- 
sidered. Clustering a few servers when load-balancing 
between them can increase the efficiency of access con- 
trol policy processing. However, co-currency control 
should be taken care of when there is more than one run- 
ning server. 
7.5. Other Security Measures 
EPCDS is considered as trusted and reliable agent be- 
tween user and EPCIS resources. To use EPCDS in prac- 
tical business world, there are many security measures to 
be considered and implemented. 
7.5.1. Authentication 
Current SecDS model does not implement any public key 
based authentication schemas for users and resources. In 
reality, there should be a certificate authority which can 
verify the authenticity of publishing and querying com- 
panies and their roles in supply chain.  
7.5.2. Integrity 
To ensure integrity of the messages communicated, every 
message should be signed with the private keys of the 
sender. 
7.5.3. Availability 
Denial-of-service attacks should also be prevented by 
limiting the number of queries for each user and pub- 
lisher.  
8. Future Direction of EPCDS 
In the future, it is expected that EPCDS will be used for 
“Internet of Things (IOT)” [7]. IOT is a network of phy- 
sical objects, expected to be implemented in near future. 
In IOT, most physical objects in the world will have 
RFID or barcode tags and become uniquely identifiable 
and connected to the Internet via RFID, sensor, and net- 
work technology. Either they are moving in certain di- 
rections or standing still in specific places, the physical 
objects will be tracked by respective owners and that 
information may be shared with relevant individuals, 
business partners or even the public. In IOT, EPCDS will 
play a critical role as a search engine, like Google in the 
current Internet. 
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